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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

DENY

(F19)

3016

Research Memorandum

RSB RM - 100, 19 May, 1962

CLASS REVIEW

To : The Secretary  
Through : S/S  
From : INR - Roger Hilsman  
Subject : Khrushchev's Conversation With Salinger

EX A - Caption removed,  
transferred to O/FADRC  
Cat B - Transferred to O/FADRC  
with additional access  
controlled by S/S  
Cat C - Caption and custody  
controlled by S/S  
Reviewed by: Eliah Kelly, Jr.  
Date: 11-20-19 75

In response to a request from Mr. Kohler, the following comments on Mr. Salinger's talks with Khrushchev.

1. The chief impression that emerges from Khrushchev's remarks to Salinger is that the Soviets still wish to probe the limits of our flexibility to determine whether a negotiated arrangement on Berlin, advantageous from their standpoint, can be obtained. After a period of muting their threats of unilateral action, Khrushchev -- as the recent Pravda Observer and Izvestiya Polyakov articles already indicated -- appears to feel that a revival of threats is useful in stimulating US willingness to negotiate.

2. Meanwhile, the Soviets themselves have made no significant modification in their position which would make that position more negotiable from our standpoint. Khrushchev's major new suggestion is a variant on the past Soviet proposals on military forces in West Berlin. (The Soviets had previously proposed that Soviet forces join Western units in West Berlin, or that neutral or UN forces replace Western forces in the city). Khrushchev now suggests "probing" the variant that forces from NATO countries other than the US, UK, and France (Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland) be stationed in West Berlin together with Warsaw Pact contingents of Polish and Czech troops for a period of 3-5 years. In addition, though not as a formal proposal, Khrushchev suggested at one point that the West might replace its "field" forces with "police" units. But he did not elaborate on this remark.

3. He also clarified several other points which have been the topic of much discussion in the East-West exchanges:

There can be no international access authority with Federal Republic participation;

Any international authority is contingent on Western troops departing from West Berlin;

Khrushchev envisages the international authority as an arbitration body to study access disputes between the Allies and the GDR on access (if this formulation was reported correctly, it would appear

### CATEGORY "A"

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the Soviets

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REVIEWED BY: 3/5/74 DATE: 1/17/70  
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FOI, EO or PA exemptions: (b)(1)

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- 2 -

the Soviets envisage some Allied role in Berlin after a Berlin settlement is made, or that the Allied powers act as agents for all users of the access routes;

The Soviet still insist any access settlement must give the GDR full control of the access routes ("Why give away what we already have?"). The arbitration body is superimposed on this full control.

4. Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty if no agreement is reached on troop withdrawal is standard -- presented in more or less the same fashion as it was in the June 4, 1961 memorandum. It gains in emphasis only because the Soviets have made relatively little use of such a threat in recent months. (The Soviets may feel safe in returning to a separate peace treaty threat since they have apparently been advising their representatives abroad to say that the US has agreed -- in the Rusk-Gromyko exchanges -- not to raise objections to the signing of a separate treaty).

5. The major item of the entire conversation -- and probably the purpose of Khrushchev's talking to Salinger -- was the proposal on stationing token Warsaw Pact-NATO Pact forces in West Berlin. (Moscow evidently intends, in the context of this proposal, that these forces replace the Allied troops, although the point is not explicitly stated. At the same time, Khrushchev demonstrated he was well aware the US is refusing to negotiate on the matter of its presence in the city).

6. Although Khrushchev clearly used Salinger to try to convey directly to the President a new sense of urgency about Soviet intentions respecting Berlin, we do not believe that Khrushchev's threatening tone indicates a decision to proceed with a separate peace treaty. In our view, Moscow is still engaged in probing our firmness and the decision regarding any drastic Soviet unilateral action remains yet to be made. At the same time, we do not exclude the possibility of new harassments designed to give substance to Khrushchev's verbal threats.

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